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The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is commonly described as a powerful international force for legal 
integration. Indeed, past studies indicate that the ECJ has developed a supranational legal order that 
trumps national law in a broad range of economic policy areas.  But this depiction of an autonomous 
Court driving European integration beyond the desires of the member-states is dubious.  We would expect 
the Court, whose existence depends on an international treaty and whose authority depends on national 
enforcement, to have strong incentives to decide cases with an eye to concerns of national governments.  
We argue that past studies--which were based on a small number of case studies--cannot demonstrate 
whether the Court is or is not sensitive to member-state interests. Based on novel dataset of all ECJ 
decisions over three years, we develop an empirical test of member-state influence on ECJ decisions and 
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The European Union (EU) is widely considered to be one of the most successful international 
organizations ever created, responsible for a wide array of policies including economic, 
monetary, social, and environmental policy. However, while the EU is now legally responsible 
for much of what used to be the sole jurisdiction of national governments, these powers are only 
meaningful if governments actually follow EU law. Thus, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) – 
as the body ultimately responsible for enforcing compliance with EU law – has become the focus 
of much study. 
The ECJ faces at least two significant challenges in trying to enforce EU law over a set of 
independent minded states. First, the ECJ has no way of making a government obey its rulings. 
Thus, at least in theory, ECJ decision-making may be influenced by the possibility of 
governments ignoring undesirable rulings. Second, governments have the power to both revise 
the EU treaty bases and pass secondary legislation at the EU level. Thus, ECJ decision-making 
also may be influenced by the possibility of governments changing the legal bases upon which 
the Court made its decision if governments do not like the Court’s application of existing law.  
Existing evidence suggests that, despite these challenges, the ECJ is successfully 
enforcing EU law against recalcitrant governments. Governments are regularly brought to court 
for violations of EU law, governments are ruled against the vast majority of the time, and 
governments regularly comply with the Court’s decisions. Further, when making decisions, the 
Court rules with the Commission position roughly 80% of the time, and appears little influenced 
by government arguments in a case. Thus, the Court appears unafraid of ruling against 
governments, perfectly capable of getting compliance with adverse decisions, and primarily 
influenced by the arguments of an ostensibly apolitical Commission.  
  2
However, while this evidence appears persuasive, recent work demonstrates that it is 
actually anything but conclusive (Carrubba, forthcoming). In fact, governments being taken to 
court regularly, being ruled against regularly, and complying regularly could be observed even if 
the court was effectively incapable of enforcing adverse decisions against national governments. 
Thus, it remains an open question whether threats of noncompliance, or treaty and/or secondary 
law revision, are credible threats that actually constrain the ECJ’s ability to enforce its 
interpretation of EU law.  
This study analyzes a year’s worth of (1997) ECJ decisions in order to evaluate to what 
degree these threats matter. The analysis includes a number of unique features. First, unlike 
previous large N studies (e.g. Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998), this study allows us to predict 
actual case outcomes; did the Court decide for the plaintiff or defendant, and is there evidence 
that this decision is influenced by possible government reactions to that decision? Second, the 
dataset codes information not just by case, but also by within-case legal issues. This coding 
scheme allows us to explore whether the ECJ is following different strategies over how it decides 
cases and how it decides on particular legal issues raised within cases. For example, we can 
determine whether the ECJ is following the “Marbury versus Madison” strategy of ruling in 
favor of the government’s position on the case, while using its ruling to establish legal precedent 
inconsistent with the longer-term goals of the government.  Finally, the dataset includes all cases 
decided by the ECJ, not just those referred to it by national courts. Doing so is valuable for 
several reasons.  First, while preliminary rulings have grown dramatically in number, they are 
historically a minority of decisions.  Thus, we know very little about the decision-making of the 
Court on the cases that represent the majority of its decisions.  Second, most of the cases that 
involve national governments as litigants are direct actions, not preliminary rulings.  If we are  
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interested in learning about how the ECJ and national governments engage on EU legal issues, 
then we obviously want to look beyond preliminary rulings.  Finally, considering the full set of 
cases allows us to evaluate whether the Court treats cases arising through national courts 
differently from cases brought before the Court directly.
1  This is an important issue.  Past 
research (e.g., Alter 1996) has identified a variety of reasons for why these cases, exactly 
because they originate in national courts and involve preliminary rulings, may induce particular 
behavior by litigants and the ECJ that would be absent in direct actions.  The rest of paper 
proceeds as follows; part 2 provides a more detailed overview of the literature’s theoretical 
expectations; part 3 presents our test; and part 4 concludes. 
 
II.  ECJ Decision-Making and Government Influence 
The European Union (EU) is a highly unusual international regulatory regime. While 
most international regulatory regimes only allow governments to bring cases against other 
governments for noncompliance with the regime’s rules, legal standing in the EU is quite 
widespread.  In particular, challenges can arise through one of two routes, direct actions and 
preliminary references.  In 2004 (the latest available data), the ECJ decided 262 cases arising 
from a national court seeking a preliminary ruling, 299 cases involving direct actions brought by 
the Commission or a member-state against a member-state, 89 appeals, and 15 cases of other 
character (Annual Report, 2004, European Court of Justice).   
Direct actions are cases brought directly to the ECJ by either the Commission – the EU 
civil service in charge of monitoring implementation of EU law, among other responsibilities – 
                                                 
1 Of course, one must recognize the caveat that this dataset only covers one year’s worth of decisions. It is possible 
that Court behavior changed over time (Tsebelis and Garrett 2001).  Independent of this fact, the evidence brought 
to bear in this study is the first of its kind and more inclusive in important ways than previous case studies or large N  
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or a member state government.  These cases mainly consist of cases brought by the Commission 
against a member-state for failure to fulfill its obligations under the treaties or cases brought by 
member-states against the Commission to annul a Commission decision.  Preliminary references 
arise when a private litigant brings a case to his/her national court, the national court makes a 
determination that EU law is relevant to the case, and the national court asks the ECJ for an 
interpretation of EU law. Once that opinion is passed back down to the national court, the 
national court then makes a final ruling. Importantly, while the Treaty of Rome originally did not 
allow charges of noncompliance with EU law to be brought through preliminary references, 
subsequent rulings by the ECJ transformed the preliminary ruling system into one that could be 
used to challenge government noncompliance.
2   
This breadth of standing is central to arguments that the ECJ is capably enforcing EU law 
over recalcitrant governments. While governments only rarely bring cases against other 
governments, as stated previously, we now observe hundreds of cases a year being brought by 
the Commission and private litigants, many of which are brought against governments for 
noncompliance with EU law. However, while opportunities for the Court to rule against 
governments are now widespread, some have argued that governments themselves are far from 
powerless. In particular, governments retain both legal and extra-legal means through which they 
can try to influence how the ECJ actually decides on the cases it hears. The degree to which 
these potential tools actually influence ECJ decision-making has been a matter of some debate.  
                                                                                                                                                             
analyses. Thus, while being able to analyze all cases decided by the ECJ is a valuable long-term goal, we believe 
that this analysis can still provide valuable new insights. 
2 See Alter (1996, 1998, 2001), Stone Sweet and Brunell (1998a, 1998b), Garrett (1995), Burley and Mattli (1993), 
and Mattli and Slaughter (1995, 1998) for discussion of this transformation.  
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Legal Constraints 
Under the Treaty of European Union, member state governments have the power to pass 
treaty revisions and secondary legislation. Revising treaty law is a two-step process. First, the 
member state governments must convene an intergovernmental conference, at which any 
proposed changes must be agreed upon unanimously if they are to pass. Second, the new treaty 
then must be ratified by each of the member states. This ratification process entails approval 
from the national legislature and, in some cases, approval by popular referendum.  Secondary 
legislation, by contrast, is solely a product of bargaining among the EU legislative institutions. 
The exact procedure by which a proposal becomes law depends upon the substantive content 
dealt with by the proposal. However, independent of the issue area, governments (through their 
representatives on the European Council of Ministers) are always free to force the drafting of a 
proposal, to amend whatever proposal is produced, and to decide whether a proposal actually 
passes. 
Some scholars have argued that government threats of treaty revision and secondary law 
influence how the ECJ decides on cases. In particular, they argue that governments can threaten 
to use these tools to change EU law if the Court interprets existing law inconsistently with how 
the governments want the law interpreted. Anticipating this reaction, they then argue that the 
Court actually may decide simply to interpret EU law consistent with government preferences in 
the first place.  For example, Garrett and Weingast write: 
“EC members maintain considerable control over the course of rulemaking through the 
Council of Ministers.  More fundamentally, the continued legitimacy of the court and its 
rulings is contingent upon the support of governments of EC members.  Put simply, the 
implicit threat of intervention by the member states, either through decisions in the 
Council of Ministers or through noncompliance with court decisions, ultimately 
constrains judicial activism in the EC” (Garrett and Weingast, 178, 1993) 
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Other scholars disagree. First, these scholars point out that passing treaty revisions is 
exceedingly difficult (Alter 2001).  As stated above, not only must governments agree upon the 
changes by unanimous consent, but the treaty then must be ratified by each of the member states. 
Even if successful, this process will take years. As a result, skeptics like Mark Pollack (1997) 
can reasonably conclude, “the threat of treaty revision is essentially the ‘nuclear option’ –
exceedingly effective, but difficult to use – and is therefore a relatively ineffective and non-
credible means of Member State control”. 
In contrast, secondary legislation is a comparatively easy process; while passage of some 
legislation still requires unanimous consent in the Council of Ministers, there is no need for 
national ratification, and much legislation now only requires a qualified majority vote.
3 
However, these scholars still argue that constraining the court through secondary legislation is 
quite unlikely for two reasons. First, even though a qualified majority vote is easier to pass, it is 
still a very high threshold. As a result, any government or governments that do not like a 
particular court decision must cobble together a large supermajority if they want to use 
secondary law to bring the Court back into line. This challenge would be relatively modest if 
court decisions affected all governments identically. However, these scholars argue, court 
decisions generally have cross-national distributive implications, and thus assembling this 
supermajority, while easier than achieving unanimous consent, is still going to be difficult. This 
challenge is often described as “the joint decision trap” (Scharpf 1988).  Second, some scholars 
also believe that the Court simply will not be influenced by these threats (Mattli and Slaughter. 
Thus, even if governments could assemble the votes necessary to pass secondary legislation, the 




Scholars also have argued that governments simply will circumvent undesirable Court 
rulings if necessary (Garrett, Keleman, and Schultz 1998; Garrett 1995; and Garrett and 
Weingast 1993; Carrubba, forthcoming).  Such evasion, at least in theory, can take many forms, 
ranging from anything as overt as blatantly ignoring a decision, to abiding by the decision only 
as it applies to that particular case, to trying to appear as if they are complying fully, while really 
avoiding the substantive impact of the ruling (e.g. passing a new national law that appears to be 
in compliance with the Court’s interpretation of EU law, but in reality is not).  Whatever the 
particular form of noncompliance, these scholars have argued that a credible threat of 
noncompliance may influence how the Court rules on a case. Similar to the argument made 
above, if the Court is concerned with its perceived legitimacy, it may not want to be seen having 
its rulings ignored, or otherwise circumvented, and, as a result, the Court might choose not to 
rule against the government in the first place. 
Note that noncompliance may provide member states with an even more powerful 
instrument of control over the ECJ than legal constraints, as it is not subject to the joint decision 
trap.  Conceivably, a particularly costly ECJ ruling could motivate a member government to 
ignore the financial sanctions handed down by the Court even without the support of other EU 
governments. 
Once more, the extent to which this threat actually influences Court behavior is a matter 
of some debate. Three counter-arguments are made. First, scholars claim that the transformation 
of the preliminary ruling system seriously constrained governments’ room for maneuver (Alter 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 Under the qualified-majority rule in the Council, each member-states is allocated a number of votes roughly 
proportionate its population.  Member-states than cast these votes on legislation, which is only adopted if the total  
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2001).  In particular, cases arising through the preliminary ruling system are cases in which 
national courts, not the ECJ, makes the final ruling.  As a result, if a government loses a case 
involving a preliminary ruling, and that government does not want to comply, the government is 
going to have to ignore a domestic court’s ruling.  To the degree that governments do not want to 
be seen violating their domestic judicial institutions, this transformation therefore will curtail 
government noncompliance.  Recall, however, a large number of cases (for most years, the 
majority of cases) do not reach the ECJ via the preliminary rulings system.  Thus, this 
transformation cannot, in a general way, eliminate the issue of member-state compliance with 
Court rulings.   
Second, as of 1996, the Commission and ECJ were granted new powers specifically 
designed to help encourage government compliance with adverse court rulings. Prior to 1996, if 
a government ignored an adverse ruling, the only option available to the Commission was to 
bring the government back to court over and over again, hoping to embarrass the government 
into compliance.  However, as of 1996, the ECJ is now allowed to impose financial penalties for 
noncompliance with previous rulings (article 228 EC).  Further, these penalties can be made 
contingent not only on the extent of the violation, but also on the size of the violator’s economy.  
This procedure has been used infrequently.  Some scholars interpret this as proof that the 
mechanism is having the desired affect of inducing states to comply (Tallberg 2002).  Of course, 
an alternative interpretation is that the Commission is reluctant to use the procedure.  The 
Commission must consider the political costs associated with bringing a member-state before the 
Court to pursue financial penalties.  Furthermore, the Commission must pursue a lengthy process 
to even engage the Court about a financial penalty.  Consequently, the infrequent use of this 
procedure can also be interpreted as evidence of its insignificance for compliance. 
                                                                                                                                                             
votes supporting the legislation surpasses a supermajority threshold.  
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  Finally, some scholars make a legalistic argument that governments are constrained to 
obey Court rulings because the law acts as a “mask and shield” for ECJ decisions (Burley and 
Mattli 1993; Mattli and Slaughter 1995, 1998).  In particular, the “mask of technical discourse” 
often hides the political repercussions of a case from governments, and ““the shield” of domestic 
norms of rule of law and judicial independence” provides a normative constraint on a 
government’s willingness to subvert court rulings (Burley and Mattli 1993).
4 
In sum, it is unclear to what degree governments are able to influence ECJ decision-
making. Governments certainly can threaten passing treaty revisions, passing secondary 
legislation, or simple noncompliance if they do not like the way the Court is ruling. However, for 
the reasons described above, it is unclear how credible these threats really are, or whether the 
Court would condition its behavior on those threats, even if they are credible. In the next section, 
we specify a test that will allow us to evaluate not only whether, but also to what degree the 
Court does condition its behavior on these potential government threats. 
One final note is warranted regarding the process by which cases come before the ECJ.  
A common concern with testing for political influences on judicial decision-making is that courts 
might select cases to decide based on exactly the political concerns we might expect to influence 
their legal decisions.  If, for example, a court were very sensitive to a particular party’s (e.g., a 
member-state’s) interests and suspected that these interests would conflict with an appropriate 
legal ruling in a case, then the court would have an incentive to avoid the case.  This sort of 
selection bias would result in a set of court decisions where we would not see political influence, 
even if the Court is very sensitive to political influence.  We are not concerned about this issue in 
                                                 
4 Others who have made more legally based arguments include Stein (1981), Rasmussen (1986), Cappelletti, et.al. 
(1986), Mancini (1991),Weiler (1991, 1993, 1994), Volcansek (1993), and Wincott (1995). Also see Shapiro and 
Stone (1994), and Stone Sweet and Brunell (1998a, 1998b) for other arguments.  
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the context of the ECJ because the Court does not exercise strict or significant docket control.  
Unlike the United State Supreme Court, the ECJ has little opportunity to manage its agenda.   
 
III. Empirical Section 
To examine for the existence and degree of member state influence on ECJ decision-
making, we coded information on the 615 cases argued before the court over three years, 1989, 
1993, and 1997.  While we have no reason to consider these years unusual, we also do not 
necessarily consider them generally representative.  Scholars have speculated that the Court’s 
willingness to pursue European legal integration and confront member-states has varied over 
time.  In addition, the membership of the Court varies over time, with slow but steady changes in 
membership.  Thus, we obviously must be cautious in inferring anything from our to Court 
behavior in other periods. It is important to note that we are in the process of collecting similar 
data for all other years of ECJ decisions.  Thus, this paper serves as a pilot analysis for a much 
broader study.  
In this year, four types of cases dominated the ECJ’s docket: preliminary references 
(360), direct actions taken against a member state (101), actions for annulment of Community 
institution decisions (73), and cases involving staff regulations covering employees of the 
European Union (38). 
Cases described in the Annual Report of the European Court of Justice consist of four 
sections. The first section summarizes the facts of the case and all of the litigants’ formal 
arguments. The facts include information such as the type of case, important dates associated 
with the case, identities of the litigants, et cetera.  The formal arguments include all legal issues 
that each side believes should influence the outcome of the case. For example, a defendant might  
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raise four points in a case, two suggesting that the plaintiff’s complaint should not be admissible 
in court, and two suggesting that the case should be dismissed on its merits.  
The second section, often appended to the end of the summary of the litigants’ 
arguments, consists of reported opinions filed by third parties, including governments, EU 
institutions, and private actors.  These opinions comment on whatever legal issues the opinion-
giver wishes to discuss, and generally come down in favor of either the plaintiff or defendant.
5  
The third section presents the conclusions of the Advocate General (AG). Every case is 
assigned to a judge of the Court for an initial reading. This judge, the AG, is responsible for 
working through all of the relevant arguments, including, but not exclusive to, the legal issues 
raised by the litigants, and issuing an initial opinion on how the case should be decided by the 
Court.  The AG’s advisory opinion is part of the materials considered by the Court when it 
makes a definitive judgment.  
The final section of the Report summarizes the conclusions of the Court.  The Court’s 
decision is presented as a series of points, in which each point disposes of a legal issue, and a 
conclusion, in which the conclusion summarizes how the case as a whole should be disposed. 
While the Court frequently addresses all of the legal issues raised in a case, it does not always do 
so.
6  Importantly, the Court can rule in favor of one litigant for one or more of the legal issues, 
but in favor of the other litigant on the case as a whole.  Returning to the example above, the 
Court might decide that the case is admissible on both counts raised by the defendant, but agree 
that the defendant should win based on the substantive merits of the case. 
                                                 
5 Unfortunately, not all opinions are included in the Annual Reports.  Sometimes opinions are simply omitted. For 
example, the Commission now has a policy of filing an opinion on every case.  However, many of these opinions are 
left unrecorded in the Annual Reports. Sometimes opinions are only mentioned.  For example, not infrequently, the 
Annual Report mentions that a government filed an opinion, but does not indicate the actual content of that opinion. 
6 While legal issues are left un-addressed under a variety of circumstances, they are most often left un-addressed 
when the Court rules that a complaint is inadmissible. Sometimes the Court does not comment on the substance of  
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From this information we created two datasets, one with each legal issue in a case as the 
unit of analysis and one with the case, which sometimes consists of multiple legal issues, as the 
unit of analysis.  These two datasets allow us to explore two separate, though related, questions.  
Analyzing case outcomes obviously allows us to determine if the final decision of the Court is 
influenced by member-state preferences.  Analyzing decisions on individual within-case legal 
issues allows us to determine if the Court is influenced by government preferences even when 
those decisions may not affect the actual outcome of the case.
7   
This distinction is important, because scholars have argued that the Court has promoted 
its legal agenda in the face of government opposition not only by simply making final rulings on 
cases that governments dislike, but also by developing legal precedent, the impact of which only 
becomes apparent over time. For example, Alter (1998) argues that politicians are mostly 
concerned with the immediate negative consequences of the case, while the ECJ takes into account 
the longer-term implications of the overall legal question.  Given these differences in time horizons, 
Alter claims that the ECJ can take advantage of “this political fixation on material consequences of 
cases to construct legal precedent without arousing political concern” (Alter 1998: 131).  In an 
empirical examination of this practice, Trevor Hartley noted: 
“A common tactic is to introduce a new doctrine gradually: in the first case that 
comes before it, the Court will establish the doctrine as a general principle but 
suggest that it is subject to various qualifications; the Court may even find some 
reason why it should not be applied to the particular facts of the case.  The principle, 
however, is now established.  If there are not too many protests, it will be re-
                                                                                                                                                             
an inadmissible complaint on its own volition, and sometimes at the request of defendants. Interestingly, the 
Commission is not hesitant to employ this tactic. 
7 Although generally there was one significant issue central to determining who actually won the case, most also 
included one or more additional legal issues concerning interpretations of the case law. Consequently, testing ECJ 
decisions on the case as a whole does not capture all of the court’s opinions expressed in the case. An example of 
this is seen in case C-340/94.  The Court found that the definition of an employed person for the purposes of social 
security should be left to legislation from each member state. The Court then clarified two other related legal issues. 
First, Community law does not preclude the legislation of one of the two member states from insuring the person in 
question.  Second, Community law does not preclude one of the two member states from determining the amount of 
contributions to be paid.    
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affirmed in later cases; the qualifications can then be whittled away and the full 
extent of the doctrine revealed” (Hartley 1988: 78-79).   
 
By examining ECJ decision-making at the legal issue unit of analysis, we are able to test the 
influence of member state opinion over the formation of legal principles.  
In both datasets, we constructed a variable indicating whether the ECJ decided in favor of 
the plaintiff (1) or defendant (0).
8  This will serve as the dependent variable in the analysis.  The 
datasets also include variables characterizing the identity of the plaintiff and defendant, and the 
stated position of third parties (via formal observations) on the legal issues or case.  Obviously, 
for cases with multiple legal issues, the coding of a third party’s position on the case was 
sometimes difficult.  For example, national governments might argue in favor of the plaintiff’s 
position on one legal issue and against the plaintiff’s position on another.  How then should one 
code whether the government was in favor of the plaintiff’s position or the defendant’s position 
on the case as a whole?  We adopted the following rules.  First, if an actor, be it a government or 
the Commission, only made observations that supported one of the two litigants, that actor was 
coded as having supported that litigant for the case as a whole.  Perhaps surprisingly, this 
decision rule was sufficient to code most observations.  For those cases in which an actor made 
observations that supported different litigants over different legal issues, we returned to the case, 
identified which observation pertained to a legal issue that would determine the outcome of the 
case, and coded the actor as intervening in favor of the litigant for whom that legal issue 
pertained. This coding scheme sufficed to code all recorded government or Commission 
observations by case.   
                                                 
8  In preliminary reference cases (article 234) the ECJ answers the legal questions referred by the national courts and 
does not assess damages in favor of the plaintiff or defendant.  This is not to say, however, that Court decisions 
cannot be interpreted in favor of either the plaintiff or defendant.  In each individual judgment, it is relatively easy to 
see the implications of the Court’s decision on each litigant’s case.   
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We followed the equivalent exercise for the ECJ decision itself.  If the ECJ ruled in favor 
of one litigant for all legal issues on which the ECJ commented, we coded the ECJ as ruling in 
favor of that litigant for the case.  For all remaining cases, we determined which legal issue 
actually determined the outcome of the case and coded the case accordingly.  
 
Hypotheses and Tests 
As stated previously, governments have two potentially credible threats with which to try 
to influence ECJ decision-making; threats of legislative override, and threats of noncompliance. 
Testing whether the Court is influenced by one and/or the other of these threats requires an 
objective measure of government preferences over Court decisions, and an operationalization of 
those government preferences that allow us to discriminate between the threats. 
We use the observations filed by governments as an indicator of how the governments 
would like the court to rule. While there might be particular circumstances under which a 
government would choose to strategically file a brief on behalf of one litigant, while sincerely 
preferring that litigant to lose, we presume for now that these circumstances will be rare at best.
9 
Thus, we assume that briefs are revealed preferences; if one is filed for the plaintiff, the 
government prefers that the Court rule on that issue in favor of the plaintiff, if one is filed for the 
defendant, the government prefers that outcome, and if no brief is filed, the government is 
indifferent. 
To test for the threat of override, we need a measure that captures the likelihood with 
which governments can successfully pass the necessary treaty revision or secondary law. Thus, 
we created a variable that measures the difference between the total number of member state 
                                                 
9 Future research will explicitly examine the question over the conditions under which a government chooses to file 
a brief.  
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government observations made in favor of the plaintiff and the total number of member state 
government observations made in favor of the defendant. This variable is labeled Net Gov 
Observations.
10  Presumably, the more observations on behalf of one litigant, and the fewer on 
behalf of the opposing litigant, the easier it should be to assemble the votes necessary for a 
legislative override, and therefore the more credible should be the threat. If the Court cares about 
this threat, therefore, the more net government support for a litigant, the more likely we should 
see the Court should decide in favor of that litigant.
11 This leads to hypothesis one. 
H1:  If member states influence the ECJ with an implicit threat of secondary legislation or treaty 
revision, the coefficient of Net Gov Observation should be statistically significant in the positive 
direction. 
 
To test for the threat of noncompliance, we need a measure that captures the conditions 
under which a threat of noncompliance is credible. Government threats of noncompliance should 
be more credible when 1) governments are litigants, and 2) other governments signal support for 
the government’s position.  The first constraint is straightforward.  If a government is a litigant, 
it can simply choose to ignore an adverse ruling.  Thus, a threat of noncompliance is eminently 
                                                 
10 We identify a government having made an observation on a case or a legal issue as defined in the previous 
section. 
11 Note that we considered two alterative measures in our analysis. The first alternative is a simple weighting of each 
observation by the number of votes that observer casts in the Council. That is, we summed the vote weighted 
number of observations on behalf of the plaintiff and subtracted from it the vote weighted number of observations 
on behalf of the defendant. This measure is a better characterization of the legislative override threat when the 
Council is voting by Qualified Majority (QMV), since it captures how many Council votes are on each side of the 
issue. The second alternative introduces the notion of the blocking minority. That is, under QMV, roughly only 28% 
of the votes are needed to blocked passage of a piece of legislation. Thus, fifty percent of the votes on behalf of a 
plaintiff might be a serious threat of override when no one is supporting the defendant, and somewhat of a threat 
when fifteen percent of the votes support the defendant, but it is almost no threat if thirty percent of the votes 
support the defendant. In the last scenario, the Court knows that it is free to vote for the plaintiff or the defendant, 
since there are enough votes on each side of the issue to prevent legislative override (pending some sort of a logroll). 
To capture this feature of the QMV rule, we first calculated the percentage of the Council votes “cast” on behalf of a 
litigant (one variable calculated the percentage for the plaintiff and one for the defendant). Next we calculated the 
the percent of votes needed to form a blocking minority on behalf of each litigant, where the values are capped at 
one if the necessary number of votes for a blocking minority are exceeded. We then created two variables, 
multiplying the percentage of votes for each litigant by one minus the percent of votes necessary to form a blocking 
minority on behalf of the other litigant. Results are generally robust across all three specifications.   
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credible if the case involves a government.
12 The second constraint arises from the existing 
literature.  As argued most recently by Carrubba (2005), international agreements often rest on 
fragile agreements in which participants benefit if everyone complies with the agreement, but 
every participant also has an incentive to defect from the agreement if they think they can get 
away with it.  The key to continued cooperation in such an environment is the threat of 
sanctioning by other governments.  That is, if other governments will punish a defector for 
violating the agreement, then a government might decide that the cost from defecting from the 
agreement exceeds any short-term benefit.  As such, punishment for being ruled in violation of 
EU law and then ignoring that ruling is less likely the more governments come out in favor of the 
defending government’s position. And, thus, the threat of ignoring an adverse ruling will be 
more credible the more governments come out in support of the defending government. 
Importantly, this analysis does not yet discriminate between whether the Court is 
responding to threats of override or threats of noncompliance. While a threat of noncompliance 
should exclusively exist in cases where governments are litigants, threats of override could exist 
whether governments are litigants or not. Thus, observing that Court decisions are correlated 
with government observations when governments are litigants is not discriminating in and of 
itself. However, what should be discriminating is the magnitude of the effect. As discussed 
previously, override requires at a minimum a qualified-majority vote, and often requires 
unanimity. Noncompliance, on the other hand, is a unilateral action. Thus, because 
noncompliance is an easier threat to execute, we should expect Court decisions to be more 
sensitive to threats of noncompliance than to threats of override. To operationalize this 
                                                 
12 One might argue that the threat is more credible when a government is a defendant than when a government is a 
plaintiff. Noncompliance with an adverse ruling as a defendant simply entails ignoring the ruling, while 
noncompliance with an adverse ruling as a plaintiff might require the government making the defendant follow its  
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expectation, we interacted the Net Gov Observations variable with a dummy variable that takes a 
value of one if a government is a litigant. This variable is labeled Net Gov Observations for 
Govs. Hypothesis two describes the expected relationship. 
H2:  If member states influence the ECJ with an implicit threat of unilateral noncompliance, then 
the coefficient of an interactive variable (Net Gov Observations X Gov is a Litigant) should be 
statistically significant in the positive direction. 
 
  We also then interact Net Gov Observations for Govs with a dummy variable that takes a 
value of one if the case is an article 177 preliminary ruling. We include this additional interaction 
to test for the possibility that threats of noncompliance are less effective when cases come 
through the national court system. This could be true for two reasons. First, as Pollack (1997) 
and others have argued, governments may be more hesitant to ignore adverse Court rulings when 
those rulings are made by national courts. Second, in preliminary rulings, the ECJ is simply 
handing down clarifications of EU law, which the national courts can then choose to do with as 
they wish. Thus, even if the ECJ offers a ruling that contains undesirable implications for the 
national government, if the national court does not follow the ECJ’s ruling there will be no need 
to engage in noncompliance. Hypothesis three describes the expected relationship. 
H3:  If member states only influence the ECJ with an implicit threat of unilateral noncompliance 
in non-article 177 references, then the coefficient of an interactive variable (Net Gov 
Observations X Gov is a Litigant X Article177) should be statistically significant in the negative 
direction and of the same magnitude as the coefficient from the term un-interacted with the 
article 177 dummy. 
 
Controls 
While government observations plausibly can act as indicators of government preferences over 
case outcomes, they may also be more than that. In particular, government observations may 
                                                                                                                                                             
wishes despite the Court ruling. We performed the analysis both by considering any case in which a government was 
a litigant and only when the government was a defendant and the results were identical.  
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simply be signals of the quality of each litigant’s case.  The better the case, all else equal, the 
more likely a government will file an observation agreeing with that litigant’s position.  If 
correct, we might find a correlation between government observations and Court decisions even 
if the Court is not responding to government threats of override or noncompliance.
13  
To control for this possibility we include an indicator of the Advocate General’s (AG) 
position on the case. As discussed previously, the AG is a judge, not on the chamber assigned to 
hear the case, who initially vets the case. That is, the AG reviews the history of the case, any 
materials or arguments filed by the litigants and all observations filed by third parties, and then 
the AG writes an initial opinion on the case. All these same materials, plus the AG opinion are 
then considered by the Court before the Court itself issues its opinion. If government 
observations are simply valid legal arguments, those arguments should influence the AG’s 
position just as much as they influence the chamber deciding the case. However, the same is not 
true if the observations are signals of threats of override or noncompliance. Simply put, 
government threats of override or noncompliance are not credible against an individual whose 
ruling is just an advisory opinion. There is no consequent law to override, and not outcome with 
which to not comply. Thus, by including an indicator of whether the AG supports the plaintiff’s 
or the defendant’s position (coded one if the AG supports the plaintiff), we can control for the 
possibility that government observations are simply indicators of valid legal arguments.   
We also include additional controls for a variety of other factors that may influence Court 
decisions.  First, we consider whether the Commission is a party to the case and, if not, whether 
it submitted a written observation on the legal issue (or the case) on behalf of the plaintiff or 
                                                 
13 This relationship would also hold if government observations are providing pertinent information and thereby 
helping persuade the Court to make the desired decision. Thus, we cannot distinguish between observations 
mattering because they are signals of the quality of a case versus making legally relevant arguments in an effort to  
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defendant.  The Commission is the source of all cases in our dataset where member-states are 
brought before the court as defendants in a direct action.  In choosing to pursue a member-state 
to the Court for infringements, the Commission has obvious incentives to choose cases it expects 
to win. Thus, the likelihood of an ECJ decision against a member-state may vary with whether 
the Commission is the plaintiff.  Furthermore, we could imagine the Court is politically sensitive 
to the position of the Commission in all cases because the Commission is an important source of 
cases for the Court.  If we believe that judges on the Court have policy goals they would like to 
pursue through rulings, then they have a vested interest in inducing the Commission to use the 
Court.
14   Obviously, generally ruling against the Commission or ignoring its observations would 
be a poor way to proceed.  Thus, we are concerned that the position of the Commission may 
influence ECJ decisions and we want to control for it.  To that end, we have created dummy 
variables identifying whether the Commission is a plaintiff or defendant in the case and whether 
the Commission has made an observation supporting the position of the plaintiff or defendant. 
Finally, we created variables for other characteristics of the case. First, we control for the 
types of plaintiffs and defendants.  Our dataset distinguishes between administrative agencies, 
private parties, and other litigants (e.g., the European Parliament) as parties to a case.  We 
include dummy variables for these parties, using private parties and other litigants (of which 
there were only a few) as the baseline category.  Including these controls allows us to isolate the 
effect governments as parties to the case from that of administrative agencies at the national or 
subnational level.  Second, we control for the type of action, by including dummies for each of 
the treaty bases under which an action can be brought. Here we omit article 177 preliminary 
                                                                                                                                                             
persuade the court of the relative merits of a position.  Either way, observations for the plaintiff and observations for 
the defendant should matter equally. 
14 Indeed, scholars have made exactly this argument with respect to the ECJ inducing national courts to refer cases 
through the preliminary ruling procedure (Alter 2001).  
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rulings as the baseline category.
15 And finally, we control for whether the chamber hearing the 
case was a panel of three, a joined panel of 5 or 7 judges, or a plenum of nine or more judges. 
Again, dummies were created, with the omitted category being panels of three judges. Tables 1 
and 2 present some summary statistics on these variables for the legal issue dataset. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Dataset of 1989, 1993, and 1997 ECJ Decisions by Legal 
Issue (N=880) 
Variable   Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
ECJ Ruling for Plaintiff  0.53 0.49  0  1 
Net Gov Observation  -0.23 1.04  -6  3 
AG Support for Plaintiff    0.53 0.50  0  1 
Commission ObservationPlf  0.42 0.49  0  1 
Commission ObservationDef   0.37 0.48  0  1 
Commission is plaintiff  0.16 0.37  0  1 
Commission is defendant  0.13 0.34  0  1 
Government is plaintiff  0.16 0.37  0  1 
Government is defendant  0.19 0.39  0  1 
Administrative agency is plaintiff  0.05 0.22  0  1 
Administrative agency is defendant  0.38 0.49  0  1 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Dataset of 1997 ECJ Decisions by Legal Issue (N=615) 
Variable Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
ECJ Ruling for Plaintiff  0.52 0.47  0  1 
Net Gov Observations  -0.21 0.95  -6  3 
AG Support for Plaintiff    0.53 0.48  0  1 
Commission ObservationPlf  0.23 0.40  0  1 
Commission ObservationDef   0.24 0.40  0  1 
Commission is plaintiff  0.19 0.40  0  1 
Commission is defendant  0.14 0.35  0  1 
Government is plaintiff  0.09 0.28  0  1 
Government is defendant  0.21 0.41  0  1 
Administrative agency is plaintiff  0.05 0.22  0  1 
Administrative agency is defendant  0.35 0.48  0  1 
 
 
Analysis and Results 
                                                 
15 Note that there were only a small number of article 171 and article 172 cases in these three years, and as a result  
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  We estimated a probit model to test these hypotheses for ECJ decision-making at the 
legal issue level (we have not had time to do the recoding necessary to analyze the data by 
case).
16  Table 3 reports the results of our analysis for the issue-level decisions.  We consider this 
the more appropriate dataset, since we avoid questions of how to aggregate decisions and 
observations over multiple issues within a single case.    
 
                                                                                                                                                             
they were dropped due to perfect multicollinearity. 
16 We make use of clustered robust standard errors where the clustering is by case.  
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Table 3.  Probit Analysis of ECJ Decisions (legal issue) 
Independent Variables  Coefficient  Clustered SE (by Case) 
Net Gov Observations   0.195** 
 
0.064 









AG for Plaintiff  1.45** 0.128 
Joined Chamber  -0.003 0.182 
Plenum  0.316* 0.135 
Commission ObservationPlf  0.399* 
 
0.168 
Commission ObservationDef  -0.455** 
 
0.162 
Commission is plaintiff  -0.620 
 
0.278 
Commission is defendant  -1.250* 
 
0.326 
 Government is plaintiff  -0.196 
 
0.239 
 Government is defendant  0.299 
 
0.247 
Administrative agency is  plaintiff  -0.173 
 
0.237 
Administrative agency is defendant  -0.007 
 
0.161 
Article 169  0.818 0.519 
Article 173  0.150 0.289 
Article 175  -0.732 0.392 
Article 178  0.099 0.488 
Article 179  0.048 0.341 
Article 33  -0.631 0.693 




** = Significant at the 1% level;  * = Significant at the 5% level  
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The results in Table 3 are consistent with all three hypotheses. The coefficient for the effect of 
net national government observations is positive and statistically significant.  The coefficient on 
the interaction term of net government observations and cases in which national governments are 
litigants is positive and statistically significant. And, the coefficient on the interaction of net 
government observations, cases in which governments are litigants, and cases that are 
preliminary rulings is negative and statistically significant (further, this last coefficient is of a 
magnitude such that it cancels the effect of the net observations when governments are litigants 
variable, chi-squared=.29).  Thus, the more government observations made on behalf of a 
plaintiff, the more likely the Court is going to rule for the plaintiff, the more government 
observations made on behalf of a defendant, the more likely the Court is going to rule for the 
defendant, and this relationship is especially strong if one of the litigants is a government in a 
direct action case. By implication, this evidence is consistent with the argument that the Court is 
sensitive to threats of override, and that the Court is especially sensitive to threats of 
noncompliance on direct actions, but not on preliminary rulings.  
  Figure 1 presents the predicted probability of a Court decision in favor of the plaintiff on 
a legal issue for a preliminary ruling case with two private actors as litigants.
17  The predicted 
probability and 95% confidence interval are plotted. As can be seen, net government 
observations matter in a substantial sense.  The probability of ruling for the plaintiff increases 
from a fifty-fifty shot when net three more observations are filed on behalf of the defendant, to a 
ninety percent chance when net three more observations are filed on behalf of the plaintiff 
(actual values range from -6 to 3).  
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Figure 1: Predicted probability of ruling for the plaintiff as a 
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Figure 2 presents the same information for the case when the Commission is bringing an 
article 169 direct action against a government. In this case the impact of the observations is 
almost deterministic. When the weight of the observations are on behalf of the defendant (i.e. 
minus two or more observations), the government loses less than 10% of the time, when support 
for the defending government is modest (i.e. minus one observation), the government wings the 
majority of the time, and when third party governments are neutral or opposed to the defending 
government (i.e. zero or more net observations), the defending government almost always loses. 
Thus, the evidence is consistent with the argument that the Court is sensitive to threats of 
government overrides and noncompliance not only in a statistical sense, but also in terms of 
                                                                                                                                                             
17 These probabilities are conditional on all variables being at their median values except the ones that we 
manipulate (e.g., the number of observations by national government).   
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substantive significance. The Court is responsive to government observations in general, and 
highly responsive when they are made on behalf of a government litigant. 
 
Figure 2: Predicted probability of ruling against the government 













-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3













































These findings have at least three important implications. First, and most obviously, they 
support the interpretation that national government observations are not serving simply as signals 
regarding the merits of the case.  Instead, the results are consistent with the story that these 
observations are used as signals of government preferences over Court decision-making, that the 
Court is sensitive to these observations when there is an implicit threat of override, and that the 
Court is highly sensitive to them when there is a implicit threat of noncompliance. 
Second, at this point it appears that preliminary rulings really are treated differently by 
the Court than direct actions. While the Court is sensitive to threats of override on preliminary  
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ruling cases, the Court is not sensitive, or at least more sensitive to threats of noncompliance. 
Rather, the effectiveness of threats of noncompliance seem limited to direct action cases. 
  Third, and finally, these results demonstrate that the Court is responsive to government 
influence not only over case outcomes (not presented here), but even when making within-case 
legal decisions. This finding suggests that the Court is not as free to create undesirable precedent 
(in the minds of the member state governments at least) by creating it within cases as might be 
believed. That is, this evidence suggests that the Court is not free to pursue a “Marbury versus 
Madison” strategy by hiding undesirable rulings within cases where the final outcome is the one 
the government wants. Simply put, the Court is demonstrably and systematically sensitive to 
government preferences as it sculpts its legal reasoning that aggregates up to case outcomes. 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
          In this paper, we made use of newly coded data to provide empirical leverage on the role of 
member state preferences in European Court of Justice decision-making.  Using the observations 
submitted by member states to gauge their preferences, we tested whether and how they exercise 
political influence over the outcomes of ECJ cases.  Our results indicate strongly that the Court is 
constrained by member state preferences, and that it responds to both legal and extra-legal threats.  
These results have important implications.  They bring the best empirical evidence yet to bear on the 
question of member-state influence over the ECJ, and also represent the first attempt to distinguish 
between legal and extra-legal methods of constraint.  That the judicial arm of the European Union 
must behave strategically to maintain its authority teaches us something about enforcement in other 
international organizations.  In the face of threats of secondary legislation, treaty revision, and 
unilateral non-compliance, the ECJ must make political calculations to preserve its future  
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credibility.  Thus the Court is, at least in part, a political actor that is sensitive to the interests of 
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